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Abstract: We establish necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for a linear taxation system to be neutral
− within the multi-period discrete time no arbi-
trage model − in the sense that valuation is invariant
to the exact sequence of tax rates, realization dates as
well as immune to timing options attempting to twist
the time profile of taxable income through wash sale
transactions.
Keywords: Tax neutrality, mark-to-market valua-
tion, generalized linear taxation schemes, wash sales.
“In the study of investments, taxes are largely a source of
embarrassment to financial economists.”
(Introduction to Dybvig and Ross (1986))
“Accordingly, my approach in this chapter is to examine the
restrictions on the income measurement rules applicable to
financial instruments implied by the requirement that the
rules be linear. .... Linearity is a desideratum of a tidy tax
system.”
(Bradford (2000), p. 373-374)
1 Introduction
Tax considerations play a very important role in most real world investment decisions, whether
financial or real. Tax issues, for example the use of tax shields, are also a cornerstone in corporate
finance and capital structure theory. It is a remarkable fact, however, that the asset pricing
literature by and large ignores taxation issues and has little to say about the effects of different
tax systems on asset demand functions and equilibrium market prices. Major textbooks on asset
pricing theory and fixed-income analysis do not even have the word taxation or related topics
in their index.
There may be a variety of reasons for why the asset pricing literature almost ignores taxation.
First, taxation issues are complicated and tend to destroy analytically attractive structures of
asset pricing models. Taxation induces a certain individual element into return distributions
and pricing relations, because return distributions and discount factors depend on the tax rules.
If arbitrage opportunities after tax exist, some constraints like limits to tax deductability,
limits to short positions or other asset allocation restrictions are necessary in order to limit the
extent to which such arbitrage opportunities can be exploited. The resulting market situation
will be one marked by corner solutions and clientele effects which are inherently complicated to
model.
Second, the tax system may be neutral in the sense that different agents with different tax rates
− and maybe even different tax codes − coexist without experiencing arbitrage opportunities.
If this is the case one can safely ignore tax considerations. Taxation rules which lead to agree-
ment about asset prices across investors subject to different tax rates and also eliminate the
profitability of portfolio dispositions solely made in order to avoid or defer tax payments are
known as neutral taxation systems.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the characteristics of such neutral taxation systems
within the no arbitrage paradigm of mathematical finance. The analysis is carried out for
linear taxation systems in order to stay within this paradigm and its characterization of linear
pricing operators in terms of equivalent martingale measures.1) It obtains a complete charac-
terization of these systems and, hence, is able to identify when taxation issues can be ignored
in asset pricing models.
We ask and answer the following simple question: If a set of asset prices and return distributions
presents a usual no arbitrage equilibrium before tax, under what conditions will it also be
a no arbitrage equilibrium after tax for another investor subject to a linear and symmetric
tax schedule. Or, more generally, if a set of asset prices and return distributions presents a no
arbitrage equilibrium after tax for some taxable investor subject to a linear and symmetric tax
schedule, under what conditions will it also be a no arbitrage equilibrium after tax for any
other taxable investor subject to a linear and symmetric tax schedule? This is our first criterion
for a taxation system to be called neutral and we denote it as valuation neutrality. The
second criterion is that wash sale opportunities and timing options in a multi-period framework
are eliminated. We denote this as holding period neutrality.
Clearly, the whole structure of prices and return distributions could − in a more fundamental
sense − change as a result of introducing or changing taxes. Obvious channels for such conse-
1)In a utility optimization model and even more in a complete equilibrium model arbitrage opportunities after
tax can be bounded by having a progressive tax schedule. However, such models require the modeling of the
individual’s portfolio composition as a whole, cf. e.g. Ross (1987), Dammon and Green (1987) and − recently −
Basak and Croituro (2001). This is not the issue here. We restrict ourselves to an investigation of how far the
no arbitrage paradigm and the consequent linearity of the pricing operator can be taken.
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quences are wealth effects or wealth redistribution effects; additionally, taxation involves a risk
sharing mechanism between the government and the taxpaying investor that may be affected
when taxes are changed. Such issues are not at stake here, however. Market prices are market
prices for taxable investors as well as for tax free investors, and the point of departure is that
market prices as well as certain types of investors with different tax rates exist. We want to
examine − in a multi-period framework − whether such market prices can be consistent with
heterogeneity across investors with respect to taxation in the sense that no arbitrage opportu-
nities exist. In particular, it is comforting to know when the usual before tax asset pricing
relations can be valid in an economic setting where none of the investors are actually tax free
investors.
Dealing with taxation in a multi-period framework raises the question about how to account for
accrued capital income as taxable income. Most of the finance literature deals with a one-period
framework, where investment takes place at the beginning of the period and capital income is
earned and taxed at the end of the period. The seminal contributions by Schaefer, cf. Schaefer
(1981, 1982a,b), belong to this class of models. Other examples are Dybvig and Ross (1986),
Dammon (1987), Dammon and Green (1987), Ross (1987), Dermody and Prisman (1988) and
Dermody and Rockafeller (1991). One-period models do not give rise to any problems with
accruals. Capital income is taxed upon realization and accrued capital income does not exist
in a one-period model. The conclusions from the one-period framework, however, cannot be
extrapolated to a multi-period framework without careful considerations.
A few papers deal with multi-period problems, but then capital income is taxed whenever it is
realized − i.e. at the point in time where it has cash flow consequences. Seminal contributions
in this direction encompass Constantinides (1983) and Constantinides and Ingersoll (1984a,b).
Other examples are Dermody and Rockafeller (1995), Dammon and Spatt (1996), and Cadenillas
and Pliska (1999). For such multi-period models it is well-known that the tax rules give rise to
lock-in effects and that tax arbitrage problems are difficult to avoid unless some restrictions −
short selling constraints, e.g. − are imposed2). Even so, taxable investors may be left with timing
options. I.e., for any given series of market price movements a taxable investor can influence to
her own advantage the timing of gains and losses as taxable income. A wash sale where assets
are sold and immediately repurchased with the sole purpose of generating a tax deferral is a
well-known example of such timing options.
Neutral taxation system have mostly been studied in the field of public economics. The neutral-
ity property is considered as a normative benchmark with which other taxation systems may be
compared and the severeness of deviations measured. However, the public economics literature
has only vaguely made use of the analytical techniques developed in finance in order to charac-
terize absence of arbitrage in financial markets. This paper shows that these techniques can
be quite powerful outside a narrowly defined territory of finance theory.
The first taxation system to be examined is the mark-to-market value principle. Although
the mark-to-market value principle is a special case of the general characterization of neutral
linear taxation systems provided in theorem 2 this is done for expositional purposes. The
practical problems with implementing such a taxation system− due to the necessity of repeatedly
assessing illiquid capital assets − are widely recognized; such assessments are easy to make
whenever a transaction realizing a capital gain or loss takes place, but difficult to make for
capital assets traded within illiquid markets and without directly observable market prices most
of the time. These difficulties may explain why pervasive mark-to-market valuation is seldom
2)Cf. also footnote 1.
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part of real-world tax systems. Despite the practical problems related to an implementation of
the mark-to-market valuation principle it appears to be the benchmark type of neutral taxation
system in the public economics literature. However, it remains to be demonstrated rigorously
within the multi-period no arbitrage paradigm that this taxation principle is neutral. This
paper does so.
Following this we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a linear and symmetric taxation
system to be neutral in a multi-period framework. We provide an exhaustive characterization of
the possible forms of linear, neutral taxation systems. Interestingly enough, these conditions do
not depend on any assumption about completeness of the market, although the necessity part
rests on an innocent regularity assumption. The mark-to-market taxation system, the imputed
wealth tax system as well as the pure cash flow taxation system due to Brown (1948) all fall
into this category as specific examples. The taxation systems proposed by Auerbach (1991),
Bradford (1995) and Auerbach and Bradford (2001) do so as well. Simultaneously, we are able
to specify exactly the degree of uncertainty allowed for in the interest rate process as well as in
the process describing the development of the tax rates over time − an issue largely neglected
in the public economics literature.3)
The paper is organized as follows. The basic results from the minimal possible no arbi-
trage model, the one-period binomial model, are stated for future reference in section 2 as
an introduction to the more general discussion in the rest of the paper. The main result for the
mark-to-market valuation principle in the discrete-time model is stated as theorem 1 in section
3. The possible interpretation of this principle in terms of a realization based tax base is given
in section 4. The main results of the paper, necessary and sufficient conditions for neutrality,
are stated as theorem 2 in section 5. Finally, section 6 shows an easy way to deal with par-
tial realizations and capital injections as an alternative to tracing each transaction individually.
Summary and conclusions are found in section 7.
Proofs are found in Appendix A. In Appendix B we relate the approach taken here to the
notation in Auerbach and Bradford (2001). Appendix C completes some details of the derivations
in section 6.
2 The one-period binomial model
Consider the usual setup for the binomial model with one risky asset and a riskless asset with
interest rate r. In this setup the fundamental pricing relation is stated in terms of the equivalent
martingale measure (q, 1−q) as
(1 + r)S0 = qSu + (1− q)Sd (1)
Let the tax rate be denoted by T ; this tax rate is assumed to be the same for all assets under
consideration and is applied linearly and symmetrically to a tax base comprised of net earn-
ings. I.e. losses are fully and unconditionally deductible with full tax consequences under all
3)In Auerbach (1991), e.g., it is mentioned on p. 171 as a parenthetical remark that “Nothing in the proof
depends on either i or t being constant, so variations over time in rates of interest and marginal taxation presents
no difficulty”. Whether this means time varying or truly stochastic interest rates and/or tax rates is not spelled
out in the paper.
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circumstances. Then equation (1) can be manipulated into
(1− T )(1 + r)S0 = (1− T ) [qSu + (1− q)Sd] ⇔
(1 + r(1− T ))S0 = q(1− T )Su + (1− q)(1− T )Sd + TS0
= q [Su − T (Su − S0)] + (1− q) [Sd − T (Sd − S0)] (2)
= q [(1− T )Su + TS0] + (1− q) [(1− T )Sd + TS0] (3)
Equation (2) reflects the taxation on a net income basis, which is identical to taxation in ac-
cordance with the mark-to-market valuation principle in this simple one-period setup. The
equivalent representation in (3) shows that the payment after tax − hence also the tax payment
itself − is a linear function of the portfolio values (S0, S1); a property to be explored more
generally in the following.
The terms in brackets are the payments after tax to the investor under such a linear tax rule
and they are denoted here by the superscript ()a.t.. Hence
(1 + r(1− T ))S0 = qS
a.t.
u + (1− q)S
a.t.
d ⇔
S0 = [1 + r(1− T )]
−1 [qSa.t.u + (1− q)Sa.t.d ]
≡
[
1 + ra.t.
]−1 [
qSa.t.u + (1 − q)S
a.t.
d
]
(4)
The pricing relation (4) is also valid for the riskless asset with Su =Sd =1 + r and S
a.t.
u =S
a.t.
d =
1 + ra.t.. The market price of the riskless asset is by definition S0 =1.
Thus, (4) is valid on an after tax basis if and only if (1) is valid on a before tax basis. The Arrow-
Debreu prices after tax are equally affected by the factor (1+r)/(1+ra.t.) and by the change from
before tax prices, [q/(1 + r), (1− q)/(1 + r)], to after tax prices, [q/(1 + ra.t.), (1− q)/(1 + ra.t.)],
relative state prices are left unaffected. Simultaneously, the payments after tax decrease. These
effects − the effect on discounting, the effect on the Arrow-Debreu prices and the effect on the
payments themselves − are precisely counteracting each other, rendering the tax rate irrelevant
for asset pricing under a linear and symmetric tax schedule4). Observe, however, that taxation
does not affect the equivalent martingale measure (q, 1−q).
The above derivations produced the no-arbitrage after tax relation (4) from the usual no
arbitrage before tax relation (1). However, there is no need for a before tax pricing relation.
If one agent with tax rate T prices assets as shown in (4), then, cf. lemma 1 below, any other
agent with a different tax rate T̂ also prices assets in accordance with (4).
Example 1
Let S0 =100, Su = 110 and Sd =95. With an interest rate of 5% the martingale probability is
q=2/3.
The corresponding after tax payments with a tax rate T = 40% are Sa.t.u = 106, S
a.t.
d = 97 and
ra.t. =3%. Then
100 = (1.03)−1
[
2
3
106 +
1
3
97
]
(5)
4)This result is also found in Cox and Rubinstein (1985), p. 271-74, as a special case. However, no multi-period
analysis after tax is found in Cox and Rubinstein (1985).
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In general
100 = (1 + 0.05(1 − T ))−1
[
2
3
(110− 10T ) +
1
3
(95 + 5T )
]
= (1.05 − 0.05T )−1 [105 − 5T ] (6)
The taxation of capital gains and losses as shown in (4) induces one particular type of risk sharing
among the investor and the tax authorities which is compatible with valuation neutrality and
the absence of arbitrage on an after tax basis. However, other linear taxation schemes and
induced risk sharing schemes with this property are possible. One extreme case would be that
the investor is allowed to earn exactly the riskless rate of return after tax in both states. In
the above example 1 the after tax result would be 103 in both states and all uncertainty about
the return on the risky investment will be borne by the tax authorities. Hence, the name
government takes all risk is appropriate for this taxation system which is obviously neutral.
Another example would be to tax the investor the amount rTS0, irrespective of the actual
outcome of the risky investment. This would leave the investor with the same risk after tax as
before tax in the sense that the spread between the two outcomes as well as the spreads relative
to the possible riskless rate of return are the same on an after tax basis as on a before tax
basis. This is known as an imputed wealth tax and is also a neutral taxation principle. A third
example would be to tax the investor in gross terms by the tax rate 1 − (1.025/1.05)' 0.0238.
This would leave more risk with the investor than the mark-to-market valuation principle; the
after tax value of the investment is 107.3810 in the up state and 92.7381 in the down state. This
is neutral because
(1 + r)S0 = qS
u + (1− q)Sd ⇔(
1 + ra.t.
)
S0 = q
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
Su + (1− q)
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
Sd (7)
independent of T .
All four schemes have the property that the tax to be paid is a linear function of the values
(S0, S1), and when applied to the riskless asset the return in both states is r
a.t.≡r(1−T ). They
also share the property that the investor earns an expected return after tax under the equivalent
martingale measure equal to the after tax rate of interest ra.t..
Multiplying (7) by 1− α and rearranging terms leads to
(
1 + ra.t.
)
S0 = q
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
(1− α)Su + (1− q)
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
(1− α)Sd + α
(
1 + ra.t.
)
S0 =
q
[
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
(1− α)Su + α(1 + ra.t.)S0
]
+ (1− q)
[
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
(1− α)Sd + α(1 + ra.t.)S0
]
(8)
This equation is trivially true also for α=1, which corresponds to the taxation principle govern-
ment takes all risk, where the investor receives (1+ra.t.)S0 in both states. α=T/(1+r
a.t.) corre-
sponds to the mark-to-market valuation taxation as discussed in (2). When α=(−rT )/(1+ra.t.)
the imputed wealth taxation system with tax payment rTS0 in both states arises. The case α=0
gives the relation (7) and is identical to the Auerbach (1991) taxation system to be discussed
more thoroughly in section 5.
5
Observe that the choice of α and the magnitude of (1 + ra.t.) are independent. No matter what
the value of α is, equation (8) is trivially true for any economically meaningful value of (1+ra.t.),
i.e. ra.t.>−15). The taxation of the riskless asset and the taxation of the risky assets may well be
quite different, although naturally related. E.g., the riskless asset may be untaxed, i.e. ra.t. =r,
which leads to the following version of (8):
(1 + r)S0 = q [(1− α)S
u + α(1 + r)S0] + (1− q)
[
(1− α)Sd + α(1 + r)S0
]
(9)
In this case α is essentially a tax rate in itself. α=0 means no taxation at all, and α=1 is again
the government takes all risk mechanism or a tax rate of 100% acting on the net gain − in
excess of an imputed riskless return rS0 − as tax base. α=T is the mark-to-market taxation,
but with untaxed interest earnings it is necessary − in order to maintain neutrality − to give
allowance for a deduction of an imputed riskless return on the initial investment:
(1 + r)S0 = q [S
u − T (Su − (1 + r)S0)] + (1− q)
[
Sd − T (Sd − (1 + r)S0)
]
(10)
The findings for this simple one-period scenario are summarized in lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The pricing relation (8) after tax for some investor
• subject to a linear and symmetric taxation
• with taxation given by α 6=1 and ra.t.>−1
is equivalent to the pricing relation (8) after tax for some other investor
• subject to a linear and symmetric taxation
• with taxation given by αˆ 6=1 and rˆa.t.>−1
Furthermore, the set of attainable claims after tax is the same for all such investors. With the
exception of α=1 this set is identical to the set of attainable claims before tax.
Proof See Appendix A.
3 The general discrete time model and mark-to-market
valuation
One-period models are void of the problems with accrued capital gains, wash sale opportunities
and timing options. The only concern for neutrality of a taxation system in a one-period model
is valuation neutrality. However, the basic insight from the one-period model is necessary in
order to study neutrality in a multi-period framework.
5)Note that − at least as an experiment of thought − it is possible that a linear taxation system could magnify
the investor’s risk position compared to the pre-tax situation. The borderline value of α is precisely −rT/(1+ra.t.),
i.e. the imputed wealth tax system.
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In a multi-period framework it is necessary to define taxation rules for accrued capital gains. In
addition to valuation neutrality it is also necessary to examine whether the tax rules are holding
period neutral.
In the rest of the paper we employ the standard setup for the discrete time model with a finite
set of possible realizations6). I.e., we are given a probability space (Ω,F , P ) where Ω is a finite
set of states: Ω ≡ {1, 2, . . . ,M} and a filtration {Ft}
t=n
t=0 to be specified shortly.
In terms of this notation, {0, 1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of time indices, where trading in financial
assets is allowed or where it is possible to either withdraw money from the portfolio in order to
consume or to invest additional equity into the portfolio.
Without loss of generality we take F to be the discrete σ-algebra:
Fn ⊆ F = 2
Ω, F0 = {Ø,Ω}, Pω>0 ∀ω ∈ Ω
The financial market has K traded assets. These assets are assumed not to pay dividends.
Dividends are easily incorporated, but they merely contribute to a more complicated notation
in the presentation of the basic arguments7). The prices at time t of these assets are denoted by
the vector St∈ IR
K . We take the filtration {Ft}
t=n
t=0 as the natural filtration, i.e. the filtration
generated by the K-dimensional price process St.
One of these assets is the bank account. This is denoted by Bt and develops as
Bt+1 = (1 + rt)Bt, B0 ≡ 1 (11)
where rt is the one-period interest rate valid at time t for the period from time t until time t+1.
The process rt may well be stochastic, but it is required to be adapted to Ft. Hence, the bank
account is a predictable process, i.e. Bt is Ft−1-measurable.
A trading strategy (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) is also a predictable process with values in IRK . θj is the
portfolio position held from time j−1 until time j. The exiting value at time j−1 is given by
the inner product θjSj−1. The entering value at time j is similarly given by the inner product
θjSj.
The following relation is a consequence of the “no arbitrage” pricing relations under any equiv-
alent martingale measure:
θ1S0 = E
Q
θnSn
Bn
+
n−1∑
j=1
(θj − θj+1)Sj
Bj
 (12)
Equation (12) expresses the valuation property that the value today of a trading strategy is the
expected present value under Q of the realization value at the horizon time n, corrected for the
net costs in present value terms of changing the portfolio at intermediate times 1, 2, . . . , n − 1.
6)The basics of the discrete time model is spelled out in numerous places. See e.g. Pliska (1997), chapter 3, for a
good introduction or Jensen and Nielsen (1996) for a comprehensive development of the discrete time model with
a finite sample space. None of the conclusions in the following depend in any essential manner on the assumption
that the sample space is finite, cf. e.g. Kabanov and Kramkov (1995). However, some technicalities are simpler
with this assumption with no loss of economic insight.
7)Dividends are discussed shortly in section 6.
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For a self-financing trading strategy, θjSj =θ
j+1Sj, so the last term in (12) − the summation −
disappears. This leads to the following relation for self-financing strategies:
0 =
n∑
j=1
EQ
[
θjSj
Bj
−
θjSj−1
Bj−1
]
(13)
Unless otherwise stated we assume in the following that the trading strategy θ j, j=1, 2, . . . , n,
is self-financing on a before tax basis. In section 6 we treat the case where the portfolio is not
self-financing, i.e. where the investor can make both withdrawals from the portfolio and capital
injections into the portfolio at any point in time.
Consider the terms in (13) one by one. Due to the no arbitrage pricing relation these terms
are individually zero, not only as unconditional expected value, but also when the expected
values are conditioned on the filtration {Ft}
t=n
t=0 . Individually they fall into the category of the
one-period model discussed in the binomial framework in section 2:
St
Bt
= EQ
[
St+1
Bt+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
⇔ θt+1St = E
Q
[
θt+1St+1(1 + rt)
−1
∣∣∣Ft] ∀θt+1∈Ft ⇔
EQ
[
θt+1 (St+1 − (1 + rt)St)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= 0 ∀θt+1∈Ft (14)
Hence, the procedure in (2)-(4) is applicable8).
Let the tax rates applied be given as the predictable process Tt, t=0, 1, 2, . . . , n−1
9). Analogous
to (11) the bank account corrected for taxation develops according to
Ba.t.t+1 = (1 + rt(1− Tt))B
a.t.
t ≡ (1 + r
a.t.
t )B
a.t.
t , B
a.t.
0 ≡ 1 (15)
By multiplying through by 1−Tt in any of the terms in (14) we get
0 = EQ
[
θt+1 (St+1 − St(1 + rt)) (1− Tt)
∣∣∣Ft] ⇒ (16)
0 = EQ
[
θt+1 (St+1 − Tt(St+1 − St))− θ
t+1St
(
1 + ra.t.t
) ∣∣∣Ft] ⇒ (17)
0 = EQ
[
θt+1 (St+1 − Tt(St+1 − St))
Ba.t.t+1
−
θt+1St
Ba.t.t
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
⇒ (18)
θt+1St
Ba.t.t
= EQ
[
θt+1 (St+1 − Tt(St+1 − St))
Ba.t.t+1
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
(19)
For a self-financing strategy this is also
θtSt
Ba.t.t
= EQ
[
θt+1 (St+1 − Tt(St+1 − St))
Ba.t.t+1
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
(20)
8)The procedure in lemma 1 is also applicable, but this section only deals with mark-to-market valuation.
9)I.e., the tax rate for the period from time t to time t+1 is known at time t and is also known before any
portfolio rebalancing decision is made at time t.
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By backwards induction it is now straightforward to verify that
θtSt
Ba.t.t
=
θt+1St
Ba.t.t
= EQ
θnSn
Ba.t.n
−
n−1∑
j=t
Tjθ
j+1(Sj+1 − Sj)
Ba.t.j+1
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
 (21)
For t=0 the value θ1S0
10) in a before tax setting is compatible with identical values in an after
tax setting, when taxes are paid on an accrual basis according to the mark-to-market value
principle. The equivalent martingale measure remains the same; the effect of taxation shows up
solely in the discounting factor and its cumulative effect, the value of the bank account B a.t.t
after tax.
Observe that this irrelevance proposition holds even if tax rates vary stochastically as a pre-
dictable process. Hence, political risk may exist as to the level of future tax rates. It is not
necessary to know the tax rates in the future in order to value a payment stream correctly
in this context. It is, however, crucial that the structure of taxation is known as being linear
and symmetric. Furthermore, whether the interest rate process rt is stochastic or not has no
influence on this conclusion.
Again, the point of departure does not have to be a tax free investor. The point of departure
might equally well have been some taxable investor for which a given set of prices does not
produce arbitrage opportunities after tax. A slightly more tedious calculation, analogous to the
one carried out in lemma 1, shows that these prices will then be compatible with any predictable
schedule of tax rates for any other investor, as long as the tax schedule is linear and symmetric.
These results are stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For the general discrete time model the pricing relation (21) after tax for some
investor
• subject to a linear and symmetric taxation and
• with tax rates following a predictable process Tt
is equivalent to the pricing relation (21) after tax for some other investor
• subject to a linear and symmetric taxation and
• with tax rates following a predictable process T̂t.
This is true for any equivalent martingale measure Q; hence the set of equivalent martingale
measures is invariant to the particular predictable process that the tax rate may follow in a
linear and symmetric mark-to-market valuation based taxation system. Furthermore, the set of
attainable claims is the same for all such investors.
Proof See Appendix A.
10)As a matter of taste one could define θ0 ≡ θ1 in order for the value at time 0 to be denoted θ0S0 instead of
θ1S0.
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4 Implementing a neutral realization based tax system
The typical objections to mark-to-market valuation based taxation are concerned with the liqui-
dity needs of the investor and the informational requirements caused by repeated assessments of
illiquid capital assets. For this reason there has been some interest in the literature to solve the
liquidity problem by constructing realization based taxation systems that eliminate wash sale
opportunities and induce holding period neutrality. Furthermore, a realization based taxation
system that only needs to observe net cash flows in and out of the portfolio to form the tax base
will solve the information problem.
Inspired by the structure of the solution (21) we define the time t tax account Aθt as the time t
cumulative balance, cum interest, on the net taxes levied upon the portfolio strategy θ:
Aθt+1 = (1 + r
a.t.
t )A
θ
t + Ttθ
t+1(St+1 − St) (22)
Aθ0 ≡ 0 (23)
The solution to this is
Aθt =
t−1∑
j=0
Tjθ
j+1(Sj+1 − Sj)
Ba.t.t
Ba.t.j+1
⇔
Aθt
Ba.t.t
=
t−1∑
j=0
Tj
θj+1(Sj+1 − Sj)
Ba.t.j+1
(24)
By means of this tax account the pricing relation (21) can be rewritten as
θtSt −A
θ
t = θ
t+1St −A
θ
t = E
Q
[
Ba.t.t
Ba.t.n
(
θnSn −A
θ
n
) ∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
⇔ (25)
θtSt −A
θ
t
Ba.t.t
=
θt+1St −A
θ
t
Ba.t.t
= EQ
[
θnSn −A
θ
n
Ba.t.n
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
(26)
This rewriting shows that any self-financing strategy θj before tax is in one-to-one correspon-
dence with a self-financing strategy after tax. This self-financing strategy after tax may be
denoted as (θj,−1), with “−1” referring to the position in the tax account Aθj .
The idea in the above account Aθj as a means to avoid liquidity problems dates back at least to
Vickrey (1939)11). The derivation shows − within the no arbitrage paradigm − that taxation
in accordance with the mark-to-market valuation principle could be implemented in the form of
a realization based taxation system in the sense that the investor pays the taxes accrued in the
account Aθj whenever the position is realized. When reinvestment takes place the tax account
is reset to zero value.
The realization based interpretation is also valid for the bank account itself. The valuation is
independent of whether the bank account is interpreted as an asset with a constant market price
and interest payments periodically paid and taxed or as a synthetic asset growing in value with
11)However, the primary purpose of Vickrey’s suggestions were more inspired by a desire to even out the tax
base and the tax payments over time than a desire to prove the neutrality of the mark-to-market valuation based
taxation in a stringent manner. Progressive taxation schedules, carry forward provisions and similar aspects of
the tax code are themselves arguments for even out procedures, and Vickrey cites earlier real life examples of
implementations of such procedures.
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periodical capital gains rtBt to be taxed at realization. Given the above implementation in (26)
the interpretation as a synthetic asset does not affect valuation and does not give rise to any
timing options.
Imagine that a wash sale operation is attempted at time t. Then the investor’s net proceeds is
θtSt−A
θ
t . If the investor borrows the balance A
θ
t in the bank account he will be able to reinvest
θtSt =θ
t+1St in the originally planned, self-financing portfolio. If held until maturity n the net
proceeds will be the gross result of the investment less (i) the time n value of the balance in the
bank account and (ii) the future tax payments resulting from the reinvestment at time t:
θnSn −A
θ
t
Ba.t.n
Ba.t.t
−
n−1∑
j=t
Tjθ
j+1(Sj+1 − Sj)
Ba.t.n
Ba.t.j+1
= θnSn −A
θ
n (27)
A similar argument can be used to show that this also holds for any stopping time strategy.
As a last remark, before moving to the analysis and characterization of linear taxation systems
in general in the next section, observe that the realization principle and the resulting tax deferral
incentives under a constant tax rate T are due to the fact that the tax account for the realization
principle is governed by the analogous difference equation
Aθt+1 = A
θ
t + Tθ
t+1(St+1 − St) (28)
Aθ0 ≡ 0 (29)
where the interest bearing element in the coefficient to Aθt has disappeared. However, when tax
rates are allowed to vary stochastically the tax deferral incentives are less clear.
We will put the realization principle into the notation to be developed in the next section and
use it as the premier example of a non-neutral taxation system.
5 Generalized linear taxation
In this section we ask and answer the following question: If the tax account is required to be a
linear function of the sequence of valuations θtSt, what are the necessary and sufficient restric-
tions on the parameters in order for the taxation system to preserve the valuation neutrality
and the holding period neutrality? The answer to this question will be given in an exhaustive
form and the models referred elsewhere in this paper will appear as special cases together with
the limitations necessary in order for them to work.
We start by specifying the value of the tax account in terms of gross taxation rates K0t,j as
follows:
Aθt =
(
1−K0t,t
)
θtSt −
t−1∑
j=0
K0t,jθ
jSj (30)
The superscript in K0t,j refers to the starting date 0 as the last date where a transaction took
place. We define K00,0≡ 1 as the natural initial condition, i.e. the tax account has initial value
zero.12) In accordance with previous requirements it is natural to request that the tax laws are
12)This means that the relations with the tax authorities are cleared at time 0 and that no relevant prehistory
exists. This is generalized in section 6.
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known at least one period in advance at the time where the last portfolio revision is allowed to
take place. I.e. K0t,j∈Ft−1 for j=0, 1, . . . , t. Since B
a.t.
t ∈Ft−1 we also have that K
0
t,j/B
a.t.
t ∈Ft−1
for j=0, 1, . . . , t.
Valuation neutrality requires that the after tax realization value at any date t, t=0, 1, 2, . . . , n−1,
is equal to the time t value of the portfolio after tax at any future date up to and including the
horizon n; i.e. for an appropriate martingale measure Q the following must hold for any pair of
dates (t,m), m ≤ n, t=0, 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1:
t∑
j=0
K0t,jθ
jSj = E
Q
[∑m
j=0K
0
m,jθ
jSj
(Ba.t.m /B
a.t.
t )
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
⇔ (31)
0 = EQ
 t∑
j=0
(
K0m,j
Ba.t.m
−
K0t,j
Ba.t.t
)
θjSj +
m∑
j=t+1
(
K0m,j
Ba.tm
)
θjSj
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
 (32)
In theorem 2 we state that for any no arbitrage pricing relation before tax and associated
equivalent martingale measure Q the conditions in (33) are sufficient conditions for (32) to be
fulfilled:
K0m,j
Ba.tm
=
K0t,j
Ba.tt
for j=0, 1, . . . , t− 1, K0t,t = B
a.t.
t
m∑
j=t
K0m,j
Ba.t.m
Bj
Bt
(33)
These conditions are also necessary provided that the stochastic dynamics of asset prices is
sufficiently rich in the sense that non-trivial trading strategies exist; i.e. trading strategies such
that θuSu/Bu is never constant for any two adjacent date-events.
13) In terms of economic
interpretation, the tax authorities or the legislators can choose a risk distribution mechanism
between the government and the investor by choosing the tax parameters (K 0n,0,K
0
n,1, . . . ,K
0
n,n).
Having done that the rest of the tax structure is determined by the development of the bank
account after tax, i.e. determined by the way riskless returns are taxed over time.
The first part of the conditions in (33) implies that the tax consequences that would have
occurred at time m, and ultimately at the horizon n, due to time periods already lapsed at
time t are invariant to the choice of realization date; hence also invariant to timing options and
attempted wash sales. The difference is solely due to the discounting effect of paying taxes later
rather than sooner, whereas the risk sharing mechanism between the investor and the government
is the same. Or, stated differently, the time 0 present value of the tax consequences when
applying the value of the bank account after tax as a stochastic discount factor is independent of
the choice of realization date. One consequence of this is that the first sum in (32) is eliminated,
except for the term j= t. Another consequence is that K 0m,j/B
a.t
m ∈Ft−1 for any t > j. Hence,
K0m,j/B
a.t
m ∈Fj.
The second part of the conditions in (33) have on the r.h.s. the tax consequences, discounted to
their time t present value, that would have occurred at time m, and ultimately at the horizon
n, in case the portfolio value θtSt had been rebalanced at time t and afterwards placed in the
bank account for the remaining time periods. On the l.h.s. is the tax consequence, related to
the portfolio value θtSt at time t, of claiming the rebalancing as a premature realization. Hence,
whether the investor claims that the portfolio is prematurely realized, with the tax consequences
given by (K0t,0,K
0
t,1, . . . ,K
0
t,t), or claims that it is rebalanced with future tax consequences given
13)Alternatively stated the splitting index is always at least two. As a matter of fact this a very modest
requirement.
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by (K0m,0,K
0
m,1, . . . ,K
0
m,m) is a matter of indifference. Again, the time 0 present value of the
tax consequences when applying the value of the bank account after tax as a stochastic discount
factor is independent of the choice of realization date.
It is worth mentioning that these restrictions are independent of whether the market is complete
or not, whether the short term interest rate is stochastic or not and whether the gross taxation
rates are stochastic or not. The only requirement on the interest rate process and the gross
taxation rates is that they are predictable.
Table 1 identifies the parameters K0n,j for the particular cases referred to in this paper.
K0n,j, j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1 K
0
n,n
Mark-to-market
[
Tj − Tj−1(1 + r
a.t.
j )
]
Ba.t.n
Ba.t.j+1
; T−1 ≡ 0 1− Tn−1
Auerbach (1991) 0 B
a.t
n
Bn
Bradford (1995)/ 1{j=0}HB
a.t
n , H ∈ [0, 1] (1−H)
Ba.tn
Bn
Auerbach&Bradford (2001)
Brown (1948) 1{j=0}TBn, B
a.t.
n = Bn 1− T
Imputed wealth tax −rjTj
Ba.t.n
Ba.t.j+1
1
Table 1: Parameterizations for five models
Among other things the second part of the conditions in (33) places strong restrictions on
the possible stochastic variation in the tax parameters and their interplay with the possi-
ble stochastic variation in interest rates and tax rates: The sum of Fj-measurable variables,
j= t, t+ 1, . . . ,m− 1, is a Ft−1-measurable variable. The mark-to-market principle is a good
example of this. Despite the possible stochastic feature of K 0n,j the sum of the r.h.s. in (33) is
(1− Tt−1)/B
a.t.
t .
The conditions in (33) are mostly relative restrictions on the model parameters. However, for
t=0 the restriction K00,0≡1 is sufficient to determine the absolute values of the parameters; i.e.
1 =
n∑
j=0
K0n,jBj
Ba.t.n
⇔ Ba.t.n =
n∑
j=0
K0n,jBj (34)
One way to read the restriction in (34) is that the result at the horizon of investing in one unit
of the bank account at time 0 should be independent of whether the return is taxed period by
period as interest income or taxed by realization at the horizon as capital gain.
Next consider a wash sale operation at time t. We assume that the self-financing portfolio policy
is reestablished by taking a short position in the bank account to pay the tax liability Aθt and
restart the linear tax system at time t with new coefficients K tn,j. Then − analogous to (31)–(32)
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− holding period neutrality is guaranteed whenever
θtSt −A
θ
t = E
Q
[∑s
j=tK
t
s,jθ
jSj −A
θ
t
(
Ba.t.s /B
a.t.
t
)
(Ba.t.s /B
a.t.
t )
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
, s = t+ 1, . . . , n ⇔ (35)
θtSt = E
Q
[∑s
j=tK
t
s,jθ
jSj
(Ba.t.s /B
a.t.
t )
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
, s = t+ 1, . . . , n (36)
The necessary and sufficient restrictions on the revised coefficients are identical to the restrictions
on the original ones. Since the starting date is now t we have − analogous to (33) − the conditions
Ktn,j
(Ba.tn /B
a.t.
t )
=
Kts,j
(Ba.ts /B
a.t.
t )
⇔
Ktn,j
Ba.tn
=
Kts,j
Ba.ts
for j= t, t+ 1, . . . , s− 1 (37)
Kts,s
(Ba.t.s /B
a.t.
t )
=
n∑
j=s
Ktn,j
(Ba.t.n /B
a.t.
t )
Bj/Bt
Bs/Bt
⇔ Kts,s = B
a.t.
s
n∑
j=s
Ktn,j
Ba.t.n
Bj
Bs
(38)
According to (37)-(38) one sufficient condition guaranteeing holding period neutrality is to con-
tinue with the original model parameters for taxation; however, the discounting must be changed
so that future values are discounted back to time t. This provides the necessary scaling so that
the revised parameters satisfy the restriction
1 =
n∑
j=t
Ktn,j
Ba.t.t
Ba.t.n
Bj
Bt
(39)
Since the tax account is reset to value zero it is also possible to “start from scratch” and change
to any another neutral system upon realization14) .
We now state the main results of the generalized linear taxation system in theorem 2.
Theorem 2 Linear and symmetric neutral taxation schedules in the discrete time “no arbitrage”
pricing model are exhaustively characterized as follows.
1. For any given “no arbitrage” equilibrium before tax and related equivalent measure Q the
parameter restrictions for any pair of dates (t,m), t=0, 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1, m ≤ n:
K0m,j
Ba.tm
=
K0t,j
Ba.tt
for j=0, 1, . . . , t− 1,
K0t,t
Ba.t.t
=
m∑
j=t
K0m,j
Ba.t.m
Bj
Bt
, K00,0 = 1 (40)
are sufficient to produce the analogous “no arbitrage” equilibrium after tax:
1
Ba.t.t
t∑
j=0
K0t,jθ
jSj = E
Q
[∑m
j=0K
0
m,jθ
jSj
Ba.t.m
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
(41)
14)Section 6 outlines one way to implement this recalculation of coefficients that is particularly well suited for
partial realizations.
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2. Assume that the stochastic dynamics of asset prices is sufficiently rich in the sense that
non-trivial self-financing trading strategies exist, i.e. self-financing trading strategies such
that θuSu/Bu is never constant across adjacent date-events. Then valuation neutrality for
any given taxable investor in the sense that (41) is fulfilled for some equivalent martingale
measure Q and any pair of dates (t,m), t= 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m − 1, m ≤ n, requires the param-
eter conditions in (40) as necessary conditions. If, furthermore, Ktt 6= 0 ∀t then valuation
neutrality for some taxable investor with some equivalent martingale measure Q implies val-
uation neutrality for any other investor with the same equivalent martingale measure, but
other taxation parameters satisfying (40).
3. Define the Fj-measurable variables ψj and the Ft−1-measurable variables φt as follows:
ψj ≡
K0n,j
Ba.t.n
, j = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, φt ≡
K0t,t
Ba.t.t
, t = 1, 2, . . . , n, φ0 ≡ 1 (42)
Then the following relations are sufficient conditions for (40) to hold:
φtBt = φnBn +
n−1∑
j=t
ψjBj, t=0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1 (43)
ψj =
K0t,j
Ba.t.t
, j = 1, 2, . . . , t− 1 and t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n− 1 (44)
ψj = φj − (1 + rj)φj+1; φ0 ≡ 1, φn+1 ≡ 0 (45)
4. The following conditions are sufficient − and under the same assumptions as in 2. necessary
− to ensure holding period neutrality, i.e. the elimination of any wash sale opportunity at
time t:
Ktn,j
(Ba.tn /B
a.t.
t )
=
Kts,j
(Ba.ts /B
a.t.
t )
⇔
Ktn,j
Ba.tn
=
Kts,j
Ba.ts
for j= t, t+ 1, . . . , s− 1 (46)
Kts,s
(Ba.t.s /B
a.t.
t )
=
n∑
j=s
Ktn,j
(Ba.t.n /B
a.t.
t )
Bj/Bt
Bs/Bt
⇔
Kts,s
Ba.t.s
=
n∑
j=s
Ktn,j
Ba.t.n
Bj
Bs
(47)
One possible choice of tax parameters K tn,j following a wash sale at time t is to set these
parameters equal to their equivalent values in an identical model with time horizon n−j and
change the reference point for discounting to time t.
5. Any convex combination of two linear and symmetric neutral taxation schedules is again a
linear and symmetric taxation schedule.
6. The set of attainable claims after tax is the same for all investors for which φt 6=0 ∀t, and
this set is identical to the set of attainable claims before tax.
Proof Part of the proof has already been sketched above. The completion of the proof is found
in Appendix A.
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From relation (45) and straightforward manipulations we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1 A neutral taxation system is given by its diagonal elements K 0tt and the wealth
dynamics for an unrealized portfolio position is given by
(θt+1St+1 −A
θ
t+1)− (1 + rt(1− Tt))
(
θtSt −A
θ
t
)
=
K0t+1,t+1
[
θt+1St+1 − (1 + rt)θ
tSt
]
(48)
The tax account develops according to
Aθt+1 = (1 + rt(1− Tt))A
θ
t + rtTtθ
tSt + (1−K
0
t+1,t+1)(θ
t+1St+1 − (1 + rt)θ
tSt) (49)
According to corollary 1 any neutral taxation system decomposes into two elements:
1. an imputed wealth tax at tax rate Tt, which can be interpreted as a tax on the change in
wealth due to “passage of time”, rtθ
tSt
2. a tax on the risky part of the pre-tax earnings, i.e. on pre-tax earnings net of the wealth
change due to “passage of time”, with tax rate 1−K 0tt.
Hence, the diagonal elements 1−K0tt have the role of tax rates applicable to the risky income
component.
Example 2: Parameter identification for well-known models
For the mark-to-market valuation we have
φt ≡
1− Tt−1
Ba.t.t
, φt+1 ≡
1− Tt
Ba.t.t+1
(50)
ψt = φt − φt+1(1 + rt)
=
1− Tt−1
Ba.t.t
−
1− Tt
Ba.t.t+1
(1 + rt) (51)
=
1− Tt−1
Ba.t.t
−
1 + rt(1− Tt)− Tt
Ba.t.t+1
(52)
=
Tt
Ba.t.t+1
−
Tt−1
Ba.t.t
(53)
For fixed T and a constant interest rate this becomes
ψt = −
Tra.t.
(1 + ra.t.)t+1
(54)
Observe that for fixed T the mark-to-market valuation principle is actually a convex combination
of two other linear taxation systems. The coefficients K 0n,j in each period arise as the imputed
wealth tax weighted by (1−T ) and the government takes all risk tax weighted by T .
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Mark-to-market value taxation is also characterized by taxing the two income components in
Corollary 1 in the same way with identical tax rates.
Auerbach’s retrospective capital gains tax model, cf. Auerbach (1991), has
φt =1/Bt and ψt =0 (55)
The “diagonal element” tends to zero for long time horizons. This means that the taxation
system approaches a pure imputed wealth taxation in the long run.15)
Auerbach’s model has been generalized in Bradford (1995) and Auerbach and Bradford (2001).
Bradford (1995) and Auerbach and Bradford (2001) are identical models in the sense that the
present value of the taxes levied upon an investment are identical, but the implementation is
different. Whereas the taxation system in Bradford (1995) taxes capital gains at a so-called
“gains recognition date”, irrespective of realization decisions and cash flows, Auerbach and
Bradford (2001) is the true cash flow taxation version of Bradford (1995). This generalized
model is similar in structure to the pure cash flow tax or Brown tax proposed in Brown (1948),
except that it is required that the bank account after tax grows with the after tax rate of interest
instead of the before tax rate of interest16).
Auerbach and Bradford’s generalized cash flow taxation model (Auerbach and Bradford (2001))
has
φt =
1−H
Bt
, ψ0 =H and ψt =0 for j = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1 (56)
Auerbach and Bradford’s generalized cash flow taxation model is also a convex combination
of two other schedules. One of them is the Auerbach (1991) system which is the corner
solution with H=0. The other is the government takes all risk taxation system, which is
the corner solution with H=1.
The mark-to-market taxation principle would turn into the Auerbach and Bradford (2001) tax-
ation system if the tax rate Tt was growing with the same growth rate as the bank account after
tax. Under such circumstances K0n,j = 0 for j = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 and K
0
n,0 = T0(B
a.t.
n /B
a.t.
1 ). The
taxation at the horizon must then be
K0n,n =
Ba.t.n
Bn
(
1−
T0
Ba.t.1
)
Hence, H=T0/B
a.t.
1 .
The Brown tax is equivalent to the Auerbach and Bradford (2001) cash flow taxation system
with H=T except that interest earnings are left untaxed.
Example 3: A neutral averaging tax system
Consider the following parameters for a neutral taxation system:
φ0 = 1, φj =
1− (j − 1)/n
Bj
, φn+1 = 0, ψj =
1
nBj
(57)
15)This is different from the original exposition in Auerbach (1991), which was formulated in continuous time.
In continuous time the retrospective capital gains taxation system is indistinguishable from the imputed wealth
taxation system.
16)The original work of Brown (1948) dealt with investment theory and the design of neutral tax depreciation
rules. The tax system was characterized as taxing the return on real investment with a tax base solely based on
“non financial” cash flows.
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This is one example of a generalized version of the Auerbach (1991) taxation system, where
the tax base is averaged out over the entire period to depend on all the portfolio values θ jSj,
j=1, 2, . . . , n instead of being dependent solely on the value observed at the horizon. It is easily
checked that the system is neutral by plugging into, e.g., the conditions in (43)-(45).
If the position is realized at time t the investor’s after tax revenue is
t∑
j=0
K0t,jθ
jSj =
1
n
t−1∑
j=1
Ba.t.t
Bj
θjSj +
(
1−
t− 1
n
)
Ba.t.t
Bt
θtSt (58)
The weight 1/n is applied to the taxation of each of the terms θjSj, j=1, 2, . . . , t− 1, in accor-
dance with the Auerbach (1991) taxation system which leaves the investor with (B a.t.j /Bj)θ
jSj
from the j’th term. This result is carried forward to time t with the bank account after tax,
Ba.t.t /B
a.t.
j . The remaining weight, (1 − (t − 1)/n), is applied to the taxation of the term θ
tSt.
Example 4: Readjustment due to wash sale
A neutral taxation principle is required to remain unaffected by wash sale attempts. For the
mark-to-market valuation we have
K0n,t = B
a.t.
n
[
Tt
Ba.t.t+1
−
Tt−1
Ba.t.t
]
, K0t,t = 1− Tt−1 (59)
Ktn,s =
Ba.t.n
Ba.t.t
[
Ts(
Ba.t.s+1/B
a.t.
t
) − Ts−1
(Ba.t.s /B
a.t.
t )
]
= Ba.t.n
[
Ts
Ba.t.s+1
−
Ts−1
Ba.t.s
]
(60)
Kts,s = 1− Ts−1 (61)
Hence, the mark-to-market value system − as expected − is unable to observe any wash sale.
Any taxation effect up to and including the wash sale date has already been activated.
For Auerbach’s retrospective capital gains tax model we have
K0n,t = 0, t 6= n, K
0
t,t =
Ba.t.t
Bt
(62)
Ktn,s = 0, s 6= n, K
t
s,s =
(
Ba.t.s /B
a.t.
t
)
(Bs/Bt)
(63)
The Auerbach (1991) system taxes the investor by retaining a certain fraction of the wealth.
This fraction depends on the holding period in a monotonous way. When a certain fraction is
captured at a realization date t<n, the remaining holding period is shortened, so the fraction
to be captured at the end of the horizon − out of the remaining wealth − is smaller. This makes
the sequence of taxation dates irrelevant as shown in (64):
Ba.t.n
Bn
=
(
Ba.t.t
Bt
)
·
(
Ba.t.n /B
a.t.
t
Bn/Bt
)
(64)
Auerbach&Bradford’s generalized cash flow taxation model has
K0n,t = 1{t=0}HB
a.t.
n , K
0
t,t = (1−H)
Ba.t.t
Bt
(65)
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=
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=
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Solving for the “correct” value of K0n0 in order to make the realization principle neutral shows
that the tax value of deducing the initial investment from the tax basis must be less than T :
K0n0 = B
a.t.
n − (1− T )Bn < T (70)
It is diminishing with the length of the time horizon and for sufficiently large values of n, K 0n0
even becomes negative! With parameter values r=10% and T =50% this happens for n close
to 15.
Figure 1 shows four curves. The upper curve is the value of the bank account before tax, and the
third curve from above is the value of the bank account after tax. The curve between these two
shows the actual end result from investing 1 in the bank account and having the returns taxed
on a realization basis. The lower curve is the value of K 0n,0 that corresponds to tax neutrality.
6 Multiple investments, withdrawals and neutral taxation
So far we have assumed that the portfolios were self-financing. This is an important simplification
and not only for the theoretical developments. Real life tax codes have different − sometimes
slightly complicated − rules for how to account for assets that are identical except for the
acquisition date; e.g. stocks in the same company bought and sold at different times. Typical
examples include (i) the assets sold are precisely identified by choice of the investor (ii) the
assets sold are identified by use of the FIFO principle, i.e. assets are identified in chronological
order (iii) the assets sold are identified by use of the LIFO principle, i.e. assets are identified in
reverse chronological order and (iv) the assets sold are not identified, but an average acquisition
price for the entire position is calculated − and recalculated upon any additional purchase −
and used as the basis for calculating taxable capital gains and losses.
Within the class of generalized linear taxation systems it is, of course, a possibility to isolate any
new injection of funds as an independent investment on its own. However, this would require a
new set of weights to be initiated for every new injection because the holding period must be
identified individually; and rules, similar to the ones above, must be determined for withdrawals.
It turns out that there is a simple recipe for handling the tax treatment of portfolios and
portfolio changes that are not self-financing. In case of a withdrawal from the portfolio at
time t the withdrawn part is simply treated as a realization in accordance with the coefficients
K0t,j , j = 0, 1, . . . , t. When a fraction x of the portfolio value is realized at time t, the tax
calculations for future realizations are reduced by the factor 1−x. On the other hand if at time
t an additional purchase is made through a capital injection into the portfolio a correction to
the tax account Aθt is needed. We will determine this correction by use of a variational analysis,
taking an existing self-financing portfolio strategy as the point of departure.
Let the capital injection be denoted by (∆θ)tSt, where the portfolio change due to the capital
injection is identified by the symbol ∆. In the time periods after t this capital injection gives
rise to changes (∆θ)jSj, j = t + 1, . . . , n, in the portfolio values. If one ignores the distinction
between “existing portfolio” and “capital injection” after time t the condition (31) for neutrality
boils down to
K0t,t(∆θ)
tSt = E
Q
[∑m
j=tK
0
m,j(∆θ)
jSj
(Ba.t.m /B
a.t.
t )
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
(71)
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Since the investor is investing (∆θ)tSt, which must be the value of the variational portfolio
changes after tax, the investor can be fully compensated for not having the holding period reset
by crediting the tax account at time t with the amount (1−K 0t,t)(∆θ)
tSt.
In appendix C we show the result of this procedure for the Auerbach (1991) taxation system
as well as for the mark-to-market valuation system and verify that the procedure is equivalent
in terms of valuation to resetting the holding period. The Brown tax is self-explanatory in this
respect18).
Now consider the case of a withdrawal, e.g. due to a dividend payment. If dividends are paid
out and not reinvested they are taxed precisely as any other realization of a part of the portfolio.
The net proceeds after tax from a withdrawal at time t making up the fraction x of the portfolio
value is
x
t∑
j=0
K0t,jθ
jSj (72)
and the taxes to be paid on future realizations are scaled down by the factor 1−x for time indices
j=0, 1, 2, . . . , t. If held until the horizon n the net proceeds after taxes, expressed in terms of
the original portfolio strategy θj, becomes
(1− x)
n∑
j=0
K0n,jθ
jSj (73)
Adding to this the proceeds from time t, carried forward to time n, we end up with a total time
n proceeds as follows:
n∑
j=0
K0n,jθ
jSj + x
Ba.t.n
Ba.t.t
 t∑
j=0
K0t,jθ
jSj
− n∑
j=0
K0n,jθ
jSj
 (74)
After appropriate reductions it is a simple calculation to show that the last part of (74) has
zero time t-value, whenever Q is an equivalent martingale measure on a before tax basis. The
requirements for this to be true are very modest, cf. statement 2 in theorem 2. The details are
given in Appendix C. This term is not identically zero due to the implicit riskless carry forward
of the taxes paid at time t, but its time t value is zero.
Alternatively, if the tax account is updated in accordance with the recursive formula in (49) it
is straightforward to account for a payment of the fraction x in case of a withdrawal at time t.
Everything in (49) is scaled down by the factor 1−x and the recursive updating mechanism can
just continue at a reduced level.
Assume alternatively that the dividends are reinvested and that the net tax bill to be paid at
time t is borrowed in the bank account. According to the scheme outlined the reinvestment
would lead to an immediate tax benefit of the magnitude x(1 −K 0t,t)θ
tSt; hence, the net taxes
paid at time t become
−
t−1∑
j=0
K0t,jxθ
jSj (75)
18)For the Bradford (1995) taxation model this procedure does not work − or, rather, it would be reduced to an
equivalent of the Auerbach (1991) system. For the Bradford (1995) system the key feature can only be maintained
by tracking each separate capital injection individually and with its own clock.
21
Repeating the carry forward argument the taxes to be paid at time n under this reinvestment
scenario become (1−K0n,n)θnSn − n−1∑
j=t
K0n,jθ
jSj
− (1− x) t−1∑
j=0
K0n,jθ
jSj (76)
Subtracting the carry forward value of the taxes paid at time t, cf. (75), leads to the net result
at time n:K0n,nθnSn + n−1∑
j=t
K0n,jθ
jSj
+ (1− x) t−1∑
j=0
K0n,jθ
jSj +
Ba.t.n
Ba.t.t
t−1∑
j=0
K0t,jxθ
jSj = (77)
n∑
j=0
K0n,jθ
jSj − x
t−1∑
j=0
(
K0n,j −
Ba.t.n
Ba.t.t
K0t,j
)
θjSj
 (78)
Because of the relations (33) each individual term in the latter sum is zero. Hence, these deriva-
tions prove the holding period neutrality of the tax mechanism proposed for partial realizations
− including wash sales − and dividend payments.
7 Summary and conclusion
The concept of a neutral taxation system is a normative benchmark with which other taxation
systems may be compared and the severeness of the deviations measured. A neutral taxation
system has the property that all investors, irrespective of their individual tax situation, agree
on the market prices and that attempts to exploit wash sale opportunities in order to generate
tax deferrals are ruled out.
This paper investigates the consequences of the “no arbitrage” assumption applied to after tax
values. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions that characterize in an exhaustive manner
when a linear and symmetric taxation system is a neutral taxation system. The paper derives
the results for the one-period binomial model in section 2 and the results for the mark-to-
market valuation principle in the general discrete time model in section 3. Section 4 introduces
the concept of the tax account where tax liabilities can be kept track of in an interest bearing
manner. This idea is crucial for the structure of the analysis in section 5 and for theorem 2, which
is the main result of the paper. This theorem encompasses existing suggestions in the literature.
Besides the mark-to-market valuation principle this is the Brown (1948) tax, the imputed wealth
tax, the Auerbach (1991) retrospective capital gains tax and the Bradford (1995) and Auerbach
and Bradford (2001) generalized cash flow taxation systems. The analysis in this paper also
points out in what sense and to what extent interest rates and tax rates can be stochastic.
The results in the paper, and in particular in theorem 2, do not depend in any way on equilibrium
model properties. They are directly in line with the no arbitrage paradigm of mathematical
finance which builds on a minimum requirement for an asset pricing model, namely that arbitrage
opportunities do not exist.
For the general version of theorem 2 we need to have a given finite time horizon. This is a
weakness when one thinks in terms of implementation along the lines of the tax rules discussed
here. Fortunately, this requirement is not needed for any of the specific examples given in table
1, where the mechanisms can be extended to any horizon.
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A Proofs
Proof (Lemma 1) In equation (8) the factor (1 + ra.t.) can be changed to any other factor
(1 + r̂a.t.) by multiplication. This is so independent of the value of α. The pricing equation (8)
is valid for the riskless asset under all circumstances, since Su = Sd = 1 + r, S0 = 1 trivially
satisfies (8).
The following calculation follows immediately from (8) when α 6=1 as well as α̂ 6=1 :
(
1 + ra.t.
)
S0 = q
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
(1− α)Su + (1− q)
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
(1− α)Sd +
α
(
1 + ra.t.
)
S0 ⇔
(1 + ra.t.)S0 = q
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
Su + (1− q)
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
Sd ⇔
(1 + ra.t.)(1 − α̂)S0 = q
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
(1− α̂)Su + (1− q)
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
(1− α̂)Sd ⇔
(1 + ra.t.)S0 = q
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
(1− α̂)Su + (1− q)
1 + ra.t.
1 + r
(1− α̂)Sd +
α̂(1 + ra.t.)S0 (A.1)
The set of attainable claims is the subspace spanned by the two vectors (Su, Sd) and (1, 1)
19):
M≡
{(
X1
X2
) ∣∣∣∣∣
(
X1
X2
)
= θ1
(
Su
Sd
)
+ θ0
(
1
1
)
, (θ0, θ1) ∈IR
2
}
(A.2)
When α 6= 1 this is obviously the same subspace as the one spanned by the vectors[
(1− α)
(
Su
Sd
)
+ (1 + r)α
(
S0
S0
)]
and
(
S0
S0
)
Each asset produces an after tax value proportional to its before tax value. However, when α=1
the only after tax values attainable are the values proportional to the vector (1, 1).
Hence, the set of attainable claims is invariant to a linear and symmetric taxation schedule for
α 6= 1.
Proof (Theorem 1) Self-evidently, none of the tax rates are allowed to be 1. The following
sequence of calculations immediately follows from (20):
(1 + rt(1− Tt))St = E
Q
[
St+1 − Tt(St+1 − St)
∣∣∣ Ft] ⇔
(1 + rt)(1− Tt)St = E
Q
[
St+1(1− Tt)
∣∣∣ Ft] ⇔
(1 + rt)(1− T̂t)St = E
Q
[
St+1(1− T̂t)
∣∣∣ Ft] ⇔
(1 + rt(1− T̂t))St = E
Q
[
St+1 − T̂t(St+1 − St)
∣∣∣ Ft] (A.3)
19)This subspace is trivially IR2 in this simple setup, but for completeness a formal proof is given.
25
Hence, this shows that the before tax pricing relation (14) can be deduced from the after tax
pricing relation (20) and that any equivalent martingale measure for some investor with pre-
dictable tax rate process Tt is also an equivalent martingale measure for any other investor with
predictable tax rate process T̂t.
The set of attainable claims is determined by the ability to revise the portfolio at each node in
the tree. The set of possible portfolio values at time t+1 is the subspace Mt spanned by the
vectors St+1; i.e.
Mt =
{
X ∈ IRM
∣∣∣∣∣ X = θSt+1, θ∈IRN
}
(A.4)
In order to see that this is the same subspace as the subspace spanned by the after tax values
one must observe that the filtration {Ft}
t=n
t=0 also generates a partition of Ω into atoms Ai∈Ft.
Atoms are the smallest subsets in Ft, a property which can be characterized as follows:
B ∈ Ft ∧B ⊆ A ⇒ B = Ø ∨B = A
An atom Ai ∈Ft splits into a collection of mutually disjoint atoms Bj, j = 1, 2, . . . , ν(t, Ai) in
Ft+1
20). If Ai∈Ft is an atom then St(ω) is constant across all ω∈Ai. Hence, the elements of
Mt are vectors with groupwise identical entries, X(B1), X(B2),. . . , X(Bν(t,Ai)), and the vector
St is characterized as a vector with groupwise identical entries St(Ai). The value of the bank
account at time t+1 is similarly a vector with groupwise identical entries Bt+1(Ai) because of
the predictability requirement; and this also goes for the bank account after tax B a.t.t+1.
Given these observations the subspace Mt is obviously the the same subspace as the one spanned
by the vectors (1−Tt)St+1 +TtSt and St for any given ω∈Ai. This is so because conditioned on
each atom the elements of the vector St is proportional to the value of the riskless asset. Hence,
the set of attainable claims is invariant to a linear and symmetric taxation schedule.
Proof (Theorem 2) The important parts of theorem 2 are statements 1. and 2. and the conditions
in (40). These provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the parameters of the taxation
system in order to ensure valuation neutrality.
The statements in 3. and the conditions (43)-(45) are merely rewritings of − and, hence, equiv-
alent to − the conditions in (40). In the same way the statements in 4. are restatements of the
conditions in (40) once it is observed that the tax account is reset to value zero at any interme-
diate realization. After such an intermediate realization the clock as well as the discounting are
both restarted.
The statement in 5. is a trivial consequence of the conditions in 1. and the equivalent conditions
in 3. Since a given linear and symmetric neutral taxation schedule is uniquely characterized by
the sequence (K0n,0,K
0
n,1, . . . ,K
0
n,n) it follows from (40) that any convex combination of two such
schedules is again a linear and symmetric neutral taxation schedule21). It can also be deduced
directly from the basic requirement in (41).
The statement in 6. is directly related to the statement in 2., which can be interpreted as an
“invertibility property”, and the proof is similar. To the extent that the risk exposure after tax is
not nullified completely, it is possible to switch between the after-tax and the before-tax relations.
20)The function ν is called the splitting function and the value ν(t,A) is called the splitting index. See Jensen
and Nielsen (1996) for further details.
21)As a matter of fact in pure mathematical terms an affine combination is sufficient. However, this might result
in taxation schedules that are economically meaningless.
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As for 1. consider the representation (32) which is equivalent to (41). Then the first half of
the conditions in (40) is obvious − the first sum in (32) vanishes except for the term j= t. It
remains to show that the rest vanishes due to the second part of the conditions in (40). This
follows from the following sequence of calculations:
θtSt
Bt
= EQ
[
θnSn
Bn
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
∧
K0t,t
Ba.t.t
=
n∑
j=t
K0n,j
Ba.t.n
Bj
Bt
⇒ (A.5)
K0t,t
Ba.t.t
θtSt = E
Q
 n∑
j=t
K0n,j
Ba.t.n
Bj
θnSn
Bn
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
 ⇒ (A.6)
K0t,t
Ba.t.t
θtSt =
n∑
j=t
EQ
[
EQ
[
K0n,j
Ba.t.n
Bj
θnSn
Bn
∣∣∣∣∣ Fj
] ∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
(A.7)
=
n∑
j=t
EQ
[
K0n,j
Ba.t.n
BjE
Q
[
θnSn
Bn
∣∣∣∣∣ Fj
] ∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
(A.8)
=
n∑
j=t
EQ
[
K0n,j
Ba.t.n
Bj
θjSj
Bj
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
(A.9)
=
n∑
j=t
EQ
[
K0n,j
Ba.t.n
θjSj
∣∣∣∣∣ Ft
]
(A.10)
This ends the proof of 1.
In order to prove 2. an induction argument is applied. Consider first an investment strategy
such that θ1S0 6= 0. For m=1, (41) takes on the form
θ1S0 =
K010
Ba.t.1
θ1S0 +
K011
Ba.t.1
EQ[θ1S1] (A.11)
Inserting the special investment strategy θ1S1 = θ
1S0B1, observing that B1 ∈ F0, leads to (40)
for this particular case:
θ1S0 =
K010
Ba.t.1
θ1S0 +
K011
Ba.t.1
θ1S0B1 ⇔ 1 =
K010
Ba.t.1
+
K011
Ba.t.1
B1 (A.12)
Given this relation, we can substitute into (A.11) and get
0 =
K011
Ba.t.1
B1
(
θ1S0 −E
Q
[
θ1S1
B1
])
(A.13)
Whenever K011 6= 0 the pricing relation before tax must be fulfilled with the equivalent martingale
measure Q. This establishes the beginning of an induction proof with t=0 and m=1.
Consider next the case m=2. For any self-financing portfolio strategy we must have the pricing
relation for t=1:
K010
Ba.t.1
θ1S0 +
K011
Ba.t.1
θ1S1 = E
Q
[
K020
Ba.t.2
θ1S0 +
K021
Ba.t.2
θ1S1 +
K022
Ba.t.2
θ2S2
∣∣∣F1]
=
K020
Ba.t.2
θ1S0 +
K021
Ba.t.2
θ1S1 +
K022
Ba.t.2
EQ
[
θ2S2 | F1
]
⇔ (A.14)(
K010
Ba.t.1
−
K020
Ba.t.2
)
θ1S0 =
(
K021
Ba.t.2
−
K011
Ba.t.1
)
θ1S1 +
K022
Ba.t.2
EQ
[
θ2S2 | F1
]
(A.15)
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The following is a special case of (A.15), corresponding to an investment strategy with θ2S2 =
θ1S1(B2/B1): (
K010
Ba.t.1
−
K020
Ba.t.2
)
θ1S0 =
(
K021
Ba.t.2
+
K022
Ba.t.2
B2
B1
−
K011
Ba.t.1
)
θ1S1 (A.16)
We also have the pricing relation for t=0:
θ1S0 = E
Q
[
K020
Ba.t.2
θ1S0 +
K021
Ba.t.2
θ1S1 +
K022
Ba.t.2
θ2S2
]
(A.17)
Assume that a self-financing investment strategy can be constructed such that θ1S0 = 0, but
θ1S1 6= 0 ∀ω ∈Ω. This is verified below. Then the following identity between random variables
immediately follows from (A.16):
K011
Ba.t.1
=
K021
Ba.t.2
+
K022
Ba.t.2
B2
B1
(A.18)
Choosing any alternative investment strategy with θ1S0 6=0 as well as θ
1S1 6=0 leads to
K020
Ba.t.2
=
K010
Ba.t.1
(A.19)
This proves the necessity of the relations (40) for m=2 and t=0, 1. Additionally, we can rewrite
(A.14) after cancellation as
0 =
K022
Ba.t.2
B2
[
EQ
[
θ2S2
B2
∣∣∣∣∣F1
]
−
θ1S1
B1
]
(A.20)
When K022 6= 0 we have the equivalent before tax relation
θ1S1
B1
= EQ
[
θ2S2
B2
∣∣∣∣∣F1
]
(A.21)
The regularity condition − that a non-trivial investment strategy exists − means that at any atom
A∈Ft it is possible to find a portfolio such that the realized return at any atom B ∈Ft+1, B ⊆ A,
is never equal to the riskless rate of return. This also implies that is always possible to find a
portfolio with zero net investment,22) such that the realized value after one period is never zero
in any state. The recipe is to combine a non-trivial investment strategy at time t with a short
position of identical value in the bank account. When t = 0 the result of such an investment
strategy is never zero in any state at time 1. Or, stated alternatively, an investment strategy
always exists such that θ1S0 =0, but θ
1S1 6=0 ∀ω∈Ω.
23) Similar reasoning can be applied at any
point in time t by simply investing in nothing until time t.
Assume now that the necessity is established for (m, t), m=0, 1, . . . , m¯, t=0, 1, . . . ,m. Consider
the relation (40) for neighboring indices m¯ and m¯+ 1:
1
Ba.t.m¯
m¯∑
j=0
K0m¯,jθ
jSj = E
Q
 1
Ba.t.m¯+1
m¯+1∑
j=0
K0m¯+1,jθ
jSj
∣∣∣∣∣Fm¯
 =
22)A zenip, cf. Harrison and Kreps (1979).
23)This is one variant of the insight found in Ross (1976).
28
1Ba.t.m¯+1
 m¯∑
j=0
K0m¯+1,jθ
jSj +K
0
m¯+1,m¯+1E
Q
[
θm¯+1Sm¯+1
∣∣∣∣∣Fm¯
] (A.22)
Following the same procedure as above we can find a self-financing portfolio strategy such that
θ1S0 = θ
1S1 = . . .=θ
m¯−1Sm¯−1 =0, θ
m¯Sm¯ 6= 0, θ
m¯+1Sm¯+1 = θ
m¯Sm¯
Bm¯+1
Bm¯
(A.23)
This establishes the necessity of the relation
K0m¯,m¯
Ba.t.m¯
=
K0m¯+1,m¯
Ba.t.m¯+1
+
K0m¯+1,m¯+1
Ba.t.m¯+1
Bm¯+1
Bm¯
(A.24)
By backwards substitution one can generate all the desired relations in the second half of (40).
Additionally, when K0m¯+1,m¯+1 6= 0 the pre-tax relation, cf. (A.21) follows along the lines of
reasoning in (A.20):
θm¯Sm¯
Bm¯
= EQ
[
θm¯+1Sm¯+1
Bm¯+1
∣∣∣∣∣Fm¯
]
(A.25)
Working backwards step by step and in turn construct investment strategies in accordance with
the recipe in (A.23) leads to the necessity of the relations
K0m¯,j
Ba.t.m¯
=
K0m¯+1,j
Ba.t.m¯+1
(A.26)
for j=m¯− 1, m¯− 2, . . . , 1, 0. This ends the induction proof of 2.
Finally, we prove statement 6. The set of attainable claims after tax at time m is the subspace∑m
j=0K
0
m,jθ
jSj spanned by all self-financing portfolios θ
j, j=0, 1, . . . ,m. By using the relations
in (40) this subspace can be rewritten as
m∑
j=0
K0m,jθ
jSj =
m−1∑
j=0
K0m,jθ
jSj +K
0
m,mθ
mSm
=
(
Ba.tm
Ba.t.m−1
)m−1∑
j=0
K0m−1,jθ
jSj +K
0
m,mθ
mSm (A.27)
When K0m,m 6=0 the argument is identical to the analogous argument in the proof of theorem 1.
We use an induction argument and assume that it has been established that the set of attainable
claims at time m−1 is invariant to the linear taxation system K 0m−1,j , j=0, 1, . . . ,m− 1. The
initialization of this induction argument is straightforward for m=1.
Analogous to the argument in the proof of theorem 1 above the elements of the vectors in this
subspace have groupwise identical entries on each atom of Ft. Hence, any desired element of the
form ψmSm can be found by
1. setting θm = ψm/K0m,m
2. work backwards to find the self-financing portfolio policy replacating this
3. adjust the position in the bank account to correct for the first term.
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B The Auerbach&Bradford analysis
The Bradford (1995) analysis imposes a linear cash flow taxation system as follows:
Aθn =
[
1− (1− g)
Ba.t.n
Ba.t.D
BD
Bn
]
θnSn −B
a.t.
n
[
1− (1− g)
BD
Ba.t.D
]
θ1S0
where 0≤D≤n is the socalled “gains recognition date” and g is the “gains taxation rate”. The
after tax payment at maturity − provided no wash sale takes place − is
θnSn(1− g)
Ba.t.n
Ba.t.D
BD
Bn
+Ba.t.n
[
1− (1 − g)
BD
Ba.t.D
]
θ1S0
In our notation H=
[
1− (1− g) BD
Ba.t.
D
]
and H=(1− g)
Ba.t.
D
BD
.
This scheme is not able to handle situations with stochastic interest rates or an otherwise
stochastic, although predictable, development in the bank account. H must be known a priori
in order for this scheme to work and it cannot be extended to encompass this type of uncertainty.
The same is true for the original Brown tax.
C Capital injections
In this appendix some details from section 6 are written out.
Model Investment Credit After tax value at maturity
Auerbach(1991) 1 1−
Ba.t.t
Bt
Bn
Bt
Ba.t.n
Bn
(unit investment)
+ B
a.t.
n
Ba.t.t
(
1−
Ba.t.t
Bt
)
(tax credit)
= B
a.t.
n
Ba.t.t
Mark-to-market 1 Tt−1 (1− Tn−1)
Bn
Bt
+
∑n−1
j=t
[
Tj
Ba.t.j+1
−
Tj−1
Ba.t.j
]
BjB
a.t.
n
Bt
+Tt−1
Ba.t.n
Ba.tt
= (1− Tn−1)
Bn
Bt
+ Tt−1
Ba.t.n
Ba.tt
+
∑n−1
j=t
[
Tj
(Ba.t.j+1/Ba.t.t )
−
Tj−1
(Ba.t.j /Ba.t.t )
]
Bj
Bt
Ba.t.n
Ba.t.t
Table 2: After tax value at maturity of a capital inflow
First we verify− for two key models− that the proposed tax crediting mechanism for incremental
capital injections has the same effect in terms of valuation as resetting the clock for the holding
period. The capital inflow at time t is assumed invested in the bank account and the initial tax
credit is carried forward via the bank account after tax. Table 2 shows that the value after tax
of a capital injection at time t is the same as the value that would occur if the investment is
taxed in accordance with the stipulated taxation principle and with its own clock.
The verification for a more general investment policy is mostly a matter of using more compli-
cated notation.
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Now we prove that the latter part of (74) has t-value zero:
EQ
Ba.t.n
Ba.t.t
 t∑
j=0
K0t,jθ
jSj
− n∑
j=0
K0n,jθ
jSj
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 =
EQ
 t∑
j=0
(
Ba.t.n
Ba.t.t
K0t,j
)
θjSj
− n∑
j=0
K0n,jθ
jSj
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 =
EQ
(Ba.t.n
Ba.t.t
K0t,t
)
θtSt −
n∑
j=t
K0n,jθ
jSj
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 = EQ
 n∑
j=t
K0n,j
Bj
Bt
θtSt −
n∑
j=t
K0n,jθ
jSj
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 =
EQ
 n∑
j=t
K0n,j
(
Bj
Bt
θtSt − θ
jSj
) ∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 = EQ
 n∑
j=t
EQ
[
K0n,j
(
Bj
Bt
θtSt − θ
jSj
) ∣∣∣Fj]
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 =
EQ
 n∑
j=t
K0n,jBjE
Q
[
θtSt
Bt
−
θjSj
Bj
∣∣∣Fj]
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
 = EQ
 n∑
j=t
K0n,jBj
[
θtSt
Bt
−EQ
(
θjSj
Bj
∣∣∣Fj)]
∣∣∣∣∣Ft

(C.28)
Since each individual term is zero by the martingale property of discounted prices it is proven
that the latter part of (74) has t-value zero.
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